Lessons Unlearnt: The (Human) Nature of Disaster Management by David Hutton
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books






Lessons Unlearnt: The (Human) Nature  
of Disaster Management 
David Hutton 
Deputy Director 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of human behavior in disaster management and 
emergency preparedness. It now is recognized that disasters are rarely ‘natural’, but rather a 
product of the interface between hazards and human activity. Population growth, 
urbanization, poverty, and poor urban planning are human causative factors which have 
received considerable attention. In response, emergency managers have engaged in 
widespread mitigation and preparedness efforts, including both investment in technologies 
and systems as well as public education and awareness-raising. The results have been 
mixed, even in the most developed countries with advanced emergency management 
systems; the European heat wave in 2003 claimed over 35,000 lives while Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 took over 1,800 lives in the United States.  
The failure to effectively respond to disaster events is generally attributed to the 
shortcomings of emergency management systems, inadequate planning, poor 
communication and/or coordination. While these reasons are certainly valid, what is 
frequently overlooked is the possible role that human nature may have in perpetuating 
these crisis. In Flirting with Disaster, Marc Gerstein (2008) points out that accidents and 
disasters are rarely accidental. Citing disasters ranging from the Challenger and Columbia 
space shuttle explosions to Chernobyl and Katrina, the author points that organizations that 
rely on a relatively small number of experts (as is the case with many emergency response 
teams) can become prone to group think which fosters its own form of human bias, 
distortion, and errors of judgment. As Gerstein points out in the case of the Columbia, “[it] 
is the story of how organizational pressures, public relations concerns, and wishful thinking 
contributed to a phenomenon known as bystander behavior - the tendency of people to stand 
on the sidelines and watch while things go from bad to worse”.  
Emergency management in North America has its roots in civil defense and by necessity 
retains a strong command and control dimension. It has also been largely driven by associated 
professions including the military, police, fire and other emergency services. As such, 
emergency management retains a hierarchical culture grounded in clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, highly functional and technical systems, and standard operating 
procedures. While such are critical to the effective management of crises and disaster events, 
research has shown that these must also be balanced with flexible decision-making, 






such, “there can be reinforced silos of hierarchy and structure that not only hinder 
communication intra- and inter-organizationally, but constrict interdisciplinary thinking, 
sharing and trans-departmental thinking” (Devitt & Bordzicz, 2008). With this, there may 
also be a devaluing of the importance of engaging and planning with (rather than for) 
external stakeholders including the public and communities. This can have the further affect 
of limiting emergency managers’ understanding of those critical factors that not only make 
communities vulnerable but can also be built upon to enhance preparedness and resiliency.  
Devitt and Borodzicz (2008) have similarly raised the importance of better understanding 
incident command systems and leadership styles. The authors note that current models of 
crisis leadership frequently fail to establish a balance between the requirement for task 
skills, interpersonal skills, stakeholder awareness and personal qualities. This can have 
significant consequences during an emergency. “Leaders managing crises under stressful 
situations are likely to revert to the style which they are most comfortable - an unconscious 
preference perhaps - and the more disturbing the situation, the stronger the urge to take 
refuge in familiar procedures” (Devitt & Borodzicz, 2008: 212). To this point, Legadic (1993, 
cited in devitt & Borodzicz, 2008) has observed, “leaders who are more task-oriented than 
human-relations oriented [may] reach the point where they neglect human relations 
altogether (and vice versa)” (212). Additionally, should subordinates be constrained by fears 
of breaching organizational taboos - be these cross-functional, technical, or hierarchical -  it 
is likely that their effectiveness and usefulness to an organization will also be compromised 
(Robert & Lajcha, 2002). 
The influence of basic human qualities such as trust can not be understated. Dekker et al. 
(2008), in studying the effectiveness of first responder agencies to learn from response 
failures, found that the least effective agencies fell short in terms of the most basic human 
qualities, these being mutual trust and participation. Milstein (in Ross, 2005: 3) has observed 
that “the development of trust is quite often the single most important tool in overcoming 
barriers and obstacles … Effective communication, goal attainment, and service attainment 
are possible only in atmosphere of trust”.  Going a step further, Peterson and Besserman 
(2010) have emphasized the importance of trust in building and maintaining informal 
networks that serve to crisscross the borders of functions, hierarchies, and business units 
that characterize most governments and organizations. “Efficiency in response is increased 
since someone who is known informally and in a positive light has a greater propensity of 
saying yes when asked for assistance and/or resources. This leads not only to more effective 
response, but more efficient response as well” (Peterson & Besserman, 2010: 9). 
Examples of failed emergency responses as a result of poor trust and limited communication 
and information sharing litter the literature of disaster and emergency management. In 
studying inter-governmental responses to disasters, Comfort (2002) observed that 
hierarchical organizations that fail to account for such factors often breakdown due to a lack 
of timely information flow and analysis, constraints on innovation, an inability to rapidly 
shift resources, as well as difficulty in responding to new and/or unexpected demands. In 
the case of the Challenger explosion, for example, Gerstein (2008) points out that a 
combination of organizational pressures, public relations concerns, and wishful thinking led 
managers to overlook the o-ring risks voiced by subordinates and launch of the shuttle. In 
the case of September 11th, investigations revealed a serious problem in the sharing of 
information between government organizations, which in turn compromised the capacity of 
www.intechopen.com
 
Lessons Unlearnt: The (Human) Nature of Disaster Management 
 
3 
the government to detect and respond to the terrorist attack (9/11 Commission, 2004). In 
reference to FEMA’s over cautiousness and delayed response to the humanitarian crisis of 
Hurricane Katrina, Sobel and Leeson (2006: 59) have argued that this in part can be traced to 
a “reluctance to trust local officials due to the widely-held perception of rampant public-
sector corruption in New Orleans (and the State of Louisiana)”.   
In part, these incidents reflect the inherent risks associated with the emergence of ‘virtual 
teams’ and organizational processes that increasingly rely on technologies and software to 
ensure coordinated planning, information management, decision-making and 
communications. While these functions are critical to managing complex operations, over-
reliance on ‘systems’ may contribute to a second set of problems associated with human 
nature.  In many cases, agencies may have specific mandates that contribute to ‘stovepipe’ 
operations, or rigid functionally organized departments that act as ‘silo traps’ for 
information (Eggers & O’Leary, 2009). When interactions do occur, especially when not face-
to-face, “cultural and language differences become magnified, as do conflicts. It is much 
easier to hide errors and problems, sweep misunderstandings under the rug, and make 
erroneous assumptions when you are communicating via phone and e-mail rather than 
person. Furthermore, such mistakes and mix-ups are more likely to become full-fledged 
disasters when the group does not feel free to acknowledge and address them openly” 
(Ross, 2005: 3). 
To this point, Delorme (personal communiqué, September 5, 2011) has observed that many 
incident command courses and trainings do not focus on leadership competencies or the 
development of these competencies with participants. Rather, the focus is typically on the 
procedures and processes of emergency response systems. This leads to “poor” leaders 
reverting and requiring adherence to the processes of incident management systems rather 
than the prima fascia issues of the emergency (namely information sharing, coordination, 
and tem work). This factor becomes more problematic as the emergency (and therefore the 
emergency response system itself) increases in complexity, requiring greater coordination, 
information sharing, and joint decision-making across agencies. In such instances, the 
importance of incident command systems and processes often decrease vis-à-vis the 
importance of leadership traits of an incident commander. These latter typically include a 
willingness to receive and share information, to rely on sources and expertise outside of 
one’s own organization, to work in coordination with other organizations, and to view the 
achievement of strategic and tactical objectives as an integrated team effort (Comfort, 2002; 
Currao, 2009). 
Since the 1990s, especially within the corporate sector, the importance of ‘soft’ leadership 
skills (or emotional intelligence) has been recognized as being critical to both effective day-
to-day management but also crisis management. Emotional intelligence can be broadly 
defined as an ability to recognize the meanings of emotion and their relationships, and to 
reason and problem-solve on the basis of these (Mayer et al., 1999). Elements of emotional 
intelligence include self-awareness of one’s strengths and weaknesses (and how these affect 
others), self-regulation of disruptive emotions and impulses, motivation to achieve beyond 
expectations, empathy or understanding or other’s feelings, and social skills to engage 
others and manage relationships (Goleman, 1998).  
Goleman (1998) has argued that while intelligence, toughness, determination and vision are 






levels of achievement. Further, emotional intelligence becomes increasingly relevant and 
important in senior management positions which require more leadership than technical 
skills.  “It is not that IQ and technical skills are irrelevant. They do matter, but mainly as 
threshold capabilities; that is, they are the entry-level requirements for executive positions … 
[But] emotional intelligence is the sine qua non of leadership. Without it, the person can 
have the best training in the world, an incisive, analytical mind, and an endless supply of 
smart ideas, but still won’t make a great leader” (Goleman, 1998: 3). 
Applied to emergency management, the concept of emotional intelligence as a premise for 
building trust, communication has obvious implications.  As noted in previous examples, 
including September 11th and Hurricane Katrina, the breakdown in both preparedness and 
response activities can often reflect a clear lack of trust between agencies and different levels 
of government. However, the concept of emotional intelligence can be applied at a more 
basic level, where nuances of human behavior may be more subtly manifested in styles of 
communication and decision-making styles that may have immediate and tragic results.  As 
one such example, the main factor leading to the 1978 United Airlines DC-8 crash in 
Portland, Oregon was attributed to the failure of the crew members to successfully 
communicate concerns to the captain that the plane was running low on fuel (National 
Aviation Safety Board, 1978). In Outliers: The Story of Success, Malcolm Gladwell cites the 
crash of Korean Air Flight 801 as an example of how cultural differences can lead to 
accidents. In the case of the Korean flight, it continued to circle the Guam airport at the 
request of the controller while running out of fuel, a decision which Gladwell attributes to a 
culture’s Power Distance Index (P.D.I.), this being a measurement of “how much a 
particular culture values and respects authority”. 
At the same time, at a much broader level, there is a need to apply the concepts of trust, 
collaboration and emotional intelligence to the strategies by which emergency managers 
engage the public and the communities they serve. In part because emergency management 
has its origins in the Cold War, filled largely by emergency services professionals with 
strong command and control backgrounds, the public has frequently been perceived as a 
problem to be solved rather than part of a solution to disasters. Schooch-Spana (2004), for 
example, has observed that exercises testing emergency response capabilities to biological 
attacks have frequently framed the public as mass casualties or hysteria-driven mobs. 
Additionally, “public communication and risk communications have become code words 
with which to skirt the multifaceted realities associated with community response to 
terrorism, bio-terrorism in particular. When authorities say they want better communication 
with the public, what they [often] tend to mean is that they want public buy-in, compliance, 
and understanding - possibly even absolute - when tough choices arise (e.g., how to 
distribute scarce resources in an emergency” (Schooch-Spana, 2004: 2).  
This attitude of a ‘problematic’ public is not only potentially pejorative but does not 
adequately reflect the complexity and underlying reasons as to why people do not 
adequately prepare for emergencies. Terms such as apathy, denial and avoidance are found 
throughout emergency preparedness literature to describe why households continue to be 
unprepared for disasters. Marsha Evans, an American Red Cross president, has used five 
amusing but not necessarily enlightening terms to describe the ‘unprepared’ public: "head 
scratchers" who don't know where to find preparedness advice; "head in the sand" types 
who believe preparation is unimportant; "head in the clouds" people who mistakenly 
www.intechopen.com
 
Lessons Unlearnt: The (Human) Nature of Disaster Management 
 
5 
believe they are ready; the "headset crowd" that is too busy and can't find time to do it; and 
people who "simply haven't thought about preparedness” (Mintz, 2004). 
These explanations, while perhaps applicable to some people, fail to capture both the 
nuances and complexity of human behavior. Indeed, the very concept of denial or normalcy 
bias (a tendency for people to underestimate the possibility of a disaster occurring and its 
possible effects) is also an essential adaptive mechanism by which people are able to cope 
with the myriad of stressors they face in life, including serious illness, the lost of loved ones 
and other tragedies they may endure.  
In part, this reflects the tendency of emergency managers to plan for disasters within their 
own silos, outside the context of other life demands. Framed within the context of emotional 
intelligence, insufficient attention and understanding (in other words, empathy) has been 
given to the fact that many people (such as the poor or chronically ill) may have more 
pressing realities of daily living that make the risk of a disaster (which may or may not 
occur) pale in comparison. To this point, Hutton et al. (2007), in studying preparedness to 
risks associated with extreme weather events in Canada, found that while 80% of 
respondents believed the weather was changing, only 4% cited it as a personal worry, in 
large part because they were more concerned with more urgent daily needs such as personal 
or family health (32%) or financial issues (28%).  
Indeed, the manner in which preparedness information is presented may often have little 
relevance to a targeted population. In a revealing survey of public perception and response 
to heat warnings across urban centres in North America, Sheridan (2006) found that while 
knowledge of the event was widespread (upwards of 90%), only 46% of respondents had 
changed their behaviour. A majority (60%) did not believe the message was meant for them 
while those that had changed their behaviour had done so because “it was hot”, not because 
of the heat warning.  This can to an extent be attributed to a failure among emergency 
managers to understand and motivate the public. To this point, Veil et al. (2009) found that 
emergency managers in the United States generally relied on one-way media and publicity 
in their effort to increase citizen emergency preparedness, conceptualizing communication 
primarily as the dissemination of preparedness messages rather than as a process of 
research and evaluation (Veil et al., 2009). This intuitively suggests that more engaging and 
alternative approaches to public awareness might result in higher levels of preparedness. 
Indeed, the American Red Cross (2006) found that much of the public is in fact not resistant 
preparedness; while 60% of surveyed Americans indicated they were unprepared for a 
disaster of any kind, 82% agreed that “If someone could make it easy for me to be prepared, 
I’d do it”.  
Despite these findings, emergency managers have been slow to adapt to new practices 
which might reach targeted populations in more effective ways. In part, this can be 
attributed to a failure to think outside the box, even after disasters occur and lessons may be 
readily drawn upon. Instead, as James (2004) has observed, organizations too often adopt a 
reactive and defensive position that prevents learning, focusing on damage control rather 
than identifying and implementing organizational change efforts aimed at reforming or 
strengthening organizational systems, policies or procedures. This has been similarly 
observed by Roux-Dufort (2007). In examining crisis management research of large scale 






Exxon Valdez incidents), Roux-Dufort found that that such were often descriptive and 
generated ‘knowledge about accidents than organizations’, rather than focusing on 
underlying organizational processes and decision-making structures that that may also 
serve as contributing factors. To this end, James (2004: 7) has written, “What is needed is not 
simply management of the situation but acts of leadership whereby the organization, crisis, 
and the environment are considered holistically … Crisis leadership first involves a corporate 
mindset that allows for the possibility that forms are vulnerable to uncontrollable events and 
that there may be bad seeds in the organization that intentionally or unintentionally engage 
in behaviors that lead to crisis”. 
The consequence of not fully understanding and engaging the public can be significant. In 
reviewing the failures of the Katrina response in regard to supporting people with 
disabilities, for example, it was found that many emergency managers were simply 
misinformed. Many shelters did not have ramps for wheelchairs, accessible toilets for 
persons with disabilities, as well as alternative information formats for the visually and 
hearing impaired (National Council on Disability, 2006). A survey of emergency managers 
further revealed that only 27% of surveyed emergency managers had taken the FEMA 
planning course for persons with special needs, 58% did not have preparedness materials 
for seniors or people with disabilities, while 57% did not know the proportion of people 
with disabilities who were residing within their jurisdictions (Fox et al, 2005). 
The solution, however, is not as straightforward as enhancing the knowledge and skills 
of emergency managers. Cahill (in Heller, 2007: 1) has observed that “one of the most 
amazing things that’s been found is just how little personal disaster planning there is 
among people with disabilities. And it’s not because the materials aren’t there but too 
few people with disabilities use it”. As an example, one year after Hurricane Katrina 
and Rita, only 3,000 people in Houston (an area also prone to severe storms) living with 
disabilities signed up with a special needs registry for services targeting people with 
disabilities during emergencies. After two years, this figure dropped to only 500 
(Heller, 2007).    
The failure of individuals to prepare for emergencies, unfortunately, is often viewed by 
emergency managers as acts of denial or irresponsibility. This is neither an accurate nor 
helpful explanation. Rather, the focus of emergency managers should be on how best to 
engage and motivate individuals and communities in activities which will enhance their 
capacity to adjust to unpredictable but potentially disastrous events. In fact, it is now 
acknowledged that simple awareness or even understanding of a possible risk is not a 
sufficient condition for behavioural change. Ronan and Johnston (2005: 7) have observed 
that motivation, as opposed to information and education, may be the sine qua non of 
community preparedness. “Despite the fact that people may be aware of both risk as well as 
strategies that can mitigate that risk, it does not follow directly that they will take the 
necessary action … Motivation is the psychological factor that fuels interest, concern, and 
action”.  
A significant challenge for emergency managers, then, is how best to motivate and engage 
individuals and communities in activities which will enhance their capacity to adjust to 
unpredictable but potentially disastrous events. To this end, Conklin (2008) has 
emphasized the importance of involving people in finding solutions, rather than simply 
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telling them what to do. “To put it more starkly, without being included in the thinking 
and decision-making processes, members of the social network may seek to undermine or 
even sabotage the projects if their needs are not considered” (3). Moreover, when 
information is not forthcoming, or from sources that are not fully trusted, invites negative 
stakeholder reaction. “Failure to adequately and in a timely fashion address a crisis 
situation gives stakeholders the opportunity to ‘fill in the blanks’. In the absence of 
information, or the presence of poor or inadequate information, people tend to assume the 
worst and then base their subsequent behaviour on those negative assumptions” (James, 
2004: 4). Perhaps among the more illustrative examples of this is the 1979 Three Mile 
Island nuclear accident, when 140,000 people evacuated the area within days as a result of 
conflicting and confusing messaging and communication from public officials. "What 
made these significant was a series of misunderstandings caused, in part, by problems of 
communication within various state and federal agencies. Garbled communications 
reported by the media generated a debate over evacuation. Whether or not there were 
evacuation plans soon became academic. What happened on Friday was not a planned 
evacuation but a weekend exodus based not on what was actually happening at Three 
Mile Island but on what government officials and the media imagined might happen. On 
Friday confused communications created the politics of fear”. (Cantelon & Williams,  
1982: 50) 
As such, emergency managers must recognize disasters as social constructs and see people 
as part of the solution rather than part of problem to be solved or managed during an 
emergency. This requires ‘people-focused’ (rather than technical) planning methodologies 
that move beyond planning for to planning with all segments of society, including the most 
vulnerable and marginalized groups that are more readily overlooked. This not only begins 
to ensure that emergency planning and response capacities can more effectively address the 
diverse needs of people, but can be an important step to engaging and empowering people to 
better prepare themselves for emergencies and other critical events.  
To achieve this, there must ultimately be a willingness to study the underlying causes of 
human behavior. Devitt and Borodzicz (2008: 212) have argued that “crisis leaders need to 
be able to put themselves in the position of all stakeholders, including the victims, and need 
to be able to recognize their diverse needs and feelings”. As such, emergency managers 
must move away from a command and control philosophy and recognize the criticality of 
human behavior in shaping how both people and organizations respond to crises and 
emergencies. From a lessons learned perspective, this will require that managers challenge 
themselves to examine how their own attitudes and beliefs impact on planning and 
response. At the core of this, as it is at the core of enhancing organizational response 
capacity, is the ability to perceive the needs of others, engage in meaningful social dialogue, 
and motivate people to undertake activities and changes that they might otherwise not. 
These are essentially the hallmarks of leadership and emotional intelligence. 
This is also at the core of moving towards a more coherent approach to identifying and 
implementing lessons that promote real change and adaptation of organizations and 
emergency management practices. As observed by Gerstein (2008), overtly defensive 
organizations and governments may be prone to anti-learning as a way to avoid blame and 
findings of faulty decision-making. As such, leaders and senior managers may also draw 






encourages and expects managers to continually identify problems (without fear or threat) 
as tool for continuous improvement (Shook, 2010). This also speaks to a basic choice in 
human behavior, that of a “[willingness and] ability to focus on solving problems without 
pointing fingers and looking to place the blame on someone” (68). This, perhaps above all 
else, is the most essential lesson to be learned should the field begin to fully address the 
human elements that contribute to lessons being unlearnt.  
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